law federalism through vehicles such as abstention.2 In the environ mental law arena, courts have employed a number of abstention theo ries to dismiss citizen suits brought under federal statutes.3 The ap pearance of primary jurisdiction and Burford abstention in citizen suits brought under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")4 exemplifies this trend.
In rejecting RCRA suits, some courts have relied on primary juris diction, a doctrine conceived as a mechanism to allocate responsibility for limited fact-finding between courts and agencies, to dismiss RCRA citizen suits. These courts have emphasized the technical nature of evaluating RCRA violations and the superiority of state agencies as the bodies to address such issues.5 Although primary jurisdiction often allows the plaintiff to return to court following agency resolution of particular issues,6 RCRA dismissals under the doctrine may be so open-ended that they are effectively final.7 Because RCRA creates an exclusively federal cause of action,8 dismissals leave citizen plaintiffs with no judicial forum. Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States that, wherever fea sible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible. Waste that is nevertheless generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment."). Other courts have applied the doctrine of Burford abstention, which allows federal court dismissal where adjudication would involve complicated questions of state law or would interfere with a state's at tempts to develop a regulatory scheme. Although the appellate courts that have invoked Burford abstention have only addressed suits that challenged permitting or siting decisions,9 lower courts have applied the reasoning to abstain from RCRA citizen suits more generally.
District courts using these rulings have extended the use of Burford to cases where the plaintiffs sought to redress RCRA violations or en dangering conditions.10 Burford claims have arisen with increasing frequency in RCRA suits, 11 probably because RCRA's jurisdictional provisions are too clear to allow for disputes about when the statute precludes a claim.
Courts that have employed these doctrines have ignored the explicit goals and jurisdictional structure of RCRA. In enacting the comprehensive statutory and regulatory provisions of RCRA, Congress adopted a scheme of environmental law with national minimum standards and provisions for federal court enforcement. To facilitate judicial oversight, Congress created two federal causes of action for citizen suits in addition to EPA and state regulatory enforcement.12 The statute also articulates the limited circumstances under which a citizen suit is barred: if either the state agency or the EPA has already commenced an enforcement action regarding the 12. These causes of action include an enforcement action that encourages private plain tiffs to fill in enforcement gaps where the EP A or state agency has not noticed or decided not to pursue an alleged violation, see 42 U. S. C. A. § 6972(a)(l)( A) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter .... "), and where there is an "imminent and substantial endangerment" cause of action, see § 6972(a)(l)(B) ("against any person ... who has contributed ... to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment"). alleged violation,13 or if plaintiffs are using the citizen suit as a way to challenge the terms of a permit or a determination as to where a particular facility will be located.14 These statutory limits determine precisely when a federal court must dismiss a RCRA citizen suit.
This Note argues that dismissals based on the primary jurisdiction and Burford abstention doctrines violate the enforcement approach developed by Congress under RCRA and constitute judicial rule making beyond the established boundaries of the two doctrines. Part I argues that the policy concerns underlying the primary jurisdiction doctrine make it inapplicable for dismissals of RCRA citizen suits be cause RCRA's statutory scheme depends on federal court oversight, not agency independence, to ensure uniformity. Part II turns to the Burford doctrine, describing the local law focus of the doctrine and demonstrating that the explicitly federally centered statutory scheme makes RCRA suits inappropriate candidates for Burford abstention. Part II also asserts that because citizen suits challenging state-issued permits -the factual setting in which the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have employed Burford abstention -are outside of the statute's ju risdictional grant, invocation of Burford in that setting is unnecessary. Part III addresses the suitability of the primary jurisdiction and Bur ford doctrines as methods for creating a judicially fashioned theory of federalism. This Part argues that in the RCRA context, federal court abstention does not productively further a more state-centered vision of cooperative federalism. This Note concludes that abstention theo ries are inappropriate in the context of an expansive federal statutory scheme, and that, absent constitutional infirmities, policy judgments as to the wisdom of such federal regulation should be left to Congress.
I. PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Primary jurisdiction, often discussed by courts along with the Burford doctrine in the context of RCRA citizen suits,15 allows a court to allocate jurisdiction between itself and an administrative agency where the forums share the ability to decide one or more of the issues at stake in the lawsuit. 16 The doctrine, first articulated by the Supreme Court in Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., allows a court either to stay its jurisdiction or to grant a dismissal pending a hearing before the agency.17
Four policy concerns underlying primary jurisdiction are fre quently discussed in the RCRA context. As a prerequisite to applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the statutory scheme at issue must be vague about whether a court or an agency should assume jurisdic tion over a matter. 18 Second, the doctrine is appropriate only where the relevant legislative body specifically holds an agency responsible for providing uniform application of a statute, 19 or where a statute dic tates that an agency's particular duties supersede those of the court.20 A court must not defer where the federal judiciary provides the only guarantee that a federal statutory scheme is uniformly applied. 18. See Jaffe, supra note 6, at 1041 ("It is undoubtedly an implied aspect of the statutory purpose that a specialized administrative tribunal has been created to deal with problems in a certain area . . . But a grant of power implies a limit, and the simultaneous grant of juris diction to the courts or a failure to abolish jurisdiction potentially conflicting may indicate where that limit is.").
19. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 {1963) (noting that primary jurisdiction "requires judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to the agency which administers the scheme"); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-41 {1907) (federal court judgment might impair Interstate Co=erce Commission's ability to impose uniform freight rates for co=on carriers, the duty assigned to it by statute).
20. See Keogh v. Chicago & NW Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162 {1922) {staying jurisdiction because regulatory powers of the ICC superseded private plaintiff's remedy under the Sherman Act).
21. Courts are split over whether a federal court may ever defer to a state, rather than to a federal agency, under primary jurisdiction. In the type of RCRA case relevant to this Note, where the acting agency is a state body, agency action might never provide the requi site authority for deferral. Third, courts have applied primary jurisdiction where a statute relies on an agency's technical specialization as a factfinder.22 Finally, pri mary jurisdiction may cure various problems arising when an agency and a court share jurisdiction in a way that affects the regulation of a particular defendant.23 The assessment of each of these concerns turns on the purposes of the statute and the roles assigned to each govern mental body acting under it. 24 This Part argues that each of these concerns weighs against apply ing primary jurisdiction to RCRA citizen suits.25 Section I.A examines the jurisdictional grant under the statute and demonstrates that this framework represents a codified system of court/agency roles needing no further judicial articulation. Section LB argues that the main policy underlying primary jurisdiction, ensuring the uniform application of a statute, weighs against the doctrine's application to RCRA suits be cause RCRA's statutory scheme relies on federal courts, not state agencies, to provide such uniformity. Section LC rejects the view that the issue of an agency's technical specialization favors dismissing RCRA citizen suits on primary jurisdiction grounds because the stat ute allocates resources for courts to achieve proficiency. Section I.D concludes that the various issues raised by potentially conflicting court and agency action do not require the application of primary jurisdic tion in the RCRA context.
A. Notice and Preclusion
RCRA's jurisdictional provisions are so specific that they leave the 22. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303-04 (1976) {discussing appli cation of primary jurisdiction where an issue "involves technical questions of fact uniquely within the expertise and experience of an agency such as matters turning on an assessment of industry conditions" (citations omitted)). federal courts with no opportunity to assert jurisdictional discretion. This congressional guidance dictates that a federal court must assume jurisdiction when a citizen suit meets the jurisdictional requirements of the statute. 26 The first jurisdictional limitation allows suit only when notice re quirements have been met. Citizen plaintiffs must provide notice to any potential defendant, the EPA, and the state administrative agency prior to commencing suit.27 This notice mechanism allows the state or the EPA to prevent a citizen suit altogether by filing its own action against the defendant28 or by compelling compliance before the citizen suit can commence.29
The specific window of time in which an alleged violator may cor rect problems without court involvement defines the role of state agencies within the context of citizen suits. Under RCRA, Congress has determined that solid and hazardous waste disposal is a matter of national concern.3 6 The statute delineates this focus clearly, concluding that "while the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, re gional, and local agencies, the problems of waste disposal ... have be come a matter national in scope and in concern and necessitate Fed eral action .... "3 7 Moreover, Congress enacted national legislation because piecemeal efforts by the states had proved inadequate to ad dress U. S. waste disposal problems.3 8
To enforce minimum national standards, RCRA empowers the EPA and citizens with broad enforcement authority. The EPA may bring either a civil or criminal suit to enforce alleged RCRA viola tions 3 9 and may also bring a suit if some activity creates an "imminent hazard" justifying injunctive relief, regardless of whether the activity involves a permit violation.40 The EP A's ongoing role demonstrates that the statutory scheme seeks to promote federal guidelines, not to sanction diverse regulatory policies in individual states.
Citizen suit availability acts as a crucial complement to EPA en forcement suits in supplying uniformity. Courts have understood the overarching purpose of citizen suits as creating private attorneys gen eral that supplement governmental enforcement of a regulatory scheme.41 In amending RCRA, Congress specifically recognized that the EPA alone had been unable to enforce the statute.42 Accordingly, well result in review by fifty different state agencies with fifty different charters, resort to state agencies is more likely to ensure non-uniformity.").
36. See 42 U.S.C.A. § § 6901(a)(4) (West 1997); 6902(a) (captioned "Objectives and na tional.policy," and including objectives of "establishing a viable Federal-State partnership" and "promoting a national research and development program"). (Vol. 98:269 in order to maximize federal court oversight, two aspects of RCRA's citizen suit provisions are particularly broad.
First, RCRA's double grant of federal court jurisdiction for citizen suits features an imminent endangerment provision that is unique to RCRA among federal environmental statutes,43 allows suit against both past and present contributors,44 and assesses liability without fault.45 The jurisdictional grant both for enforcement and imminent endangerment allows a wide variety of environmental harms to be ac tionable under RCRA's statutory mandate.
Second, the statute provides generous standing for potential citizen plaintiffs. Unlike some federal environmental statutes, which impose a zone-of-interests requirement for the establishment of statutory standing,46 RCRA's standing provision allows "any person" to bring suit.47 In choosing this language, Congress conferred standing to the fullest extent permitted by Article III.48 Congress created the broadest possible class of potential plaintiffs in order to maximize the number of private "enforcers" and to avoid dismissals in federal court based on lack of standing.49
Through its extensive jurisdictional grants for citizen-and EPA 46. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164-65. The Bennett Court reasoned that its broad construc tion of statutory standing for "any person" under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") was supported by the fact that the statute was environmental, and that Congress was obviously attempting to create "private attorneys general." 520 U.S. at 165. The Court also noted that the "any person" language was much broader than in some other environmental statutes, which create a zone-of-interests requirement. 520 U.S. at 164-65.
47. § 6972(a) ("any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf'). 
C. Technical Expertise
The third justification for primary jurisdiction, that the court should defer to an administrative body with specialized competence in a particular area,51 is a tempting rationale in favor of applying the doc trine to RCRA citizen suits. There is no dispute that RCRA is a com plicated statute52 and that environmental regulations involve complex technical matters that federal courts may not commonly encounter.53 It is understandable that a judge might prefer to transfer jurisdiction to a state agency whose sole function is to interpret and apply envi ronmental regulations.
What such deferrals depend on, however, is not the claim that a federal court cannot properly adjudicate the issues before it, but that it would be time-consuming for the court to acquire an understanding of the complicated factual and legal issues.54 Because Congress has al ready chosen to allocate federal court resources to this problem by en acting RCRA's citizen suit provisions,55 a federal court judge may not reallocate resources away from federal court jurisdiction. The statu tory jurisdictional grant indicates that Congress expects federal courts to devote the time necessary to acquire competence in the issues pre 
D. Concurrent Proceedings
The final consideration under the primary jurisdiction doctrine re lates to the problems raised by concurrent agency and court actions. Concurrent jurisdiction may require the court to make several inquir ies: whether continuing parallel proceedings might impose conflicting orders on the defendant;57 whether the administrative body will dili gently pursue the issue if the court stays or dismisses the judicial ac tion;58 and whether the federal court plaintiff will be able to obtain re lief from the administrative agency if the federal court stays the action.59 In the context of RCRA citizen suits, these issues do not jus tify application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
The first concern, that agency and federal court involvement might result in conflicting obligations for the defendant, is simply not viable where the state and federal bodies operate as part of a single regula tory scheme. In order to receive authorization from the EPA, the state's program must be equivalent to the federal program: the state may not impose requirements less stringent than those in force under the federal regulations.60 Thus, a federal court's imposition of more stringent obligations on the defendant simply brings the state adminis trative rule back into compliance with the federal statute. Under the terms of RCRA's federal-state structure, relief granted by the federal court thus cannot create a "conflicting" order on the defendant be cause federal authority ultimately defines the defendant's statutory obligations.
Second "diligent prosecut[ion]"62 by the EPA or state agency in a court bars a RCRA citizen suit. Given that statutory command, a federal court may not create a separate standard as to what level of administrative investigation is sufficient to dismiss a citizen suit. When federal courts have ignored the statutory definition of "diligence" in favor of defer ence to local agencies, communities have waited years for genuine en forcement of the statute.63 Such a result allows the old problems of purely local enforcement to resurface and thus defeats the purpose of enacting national legislation.
The final policy concern, fairness to plaintiff s, particularly supports a rejection of primary jurisdiction in the citizen suit context. Because RCRA establishes exclusive federal causes of action for citizen suits,64 citizen plaintiff s cannot take their cases to other tribunals.65 Federal court jurisdiction is thus necessary to allow plaintiff s access to the remedies provided by the statute. 66 Until recently, the federal courts were in accord that the RCRA provision stating that citizen suits "shall be brought in the district court"6 7 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts.68 The
Sixth Circuit recently defected from that view in Davis v. Sun Oil Co.,69 however, concluding that RCRA's jurisdictional language is in sufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of concurrent [ States district court," 7 5 did not establish exclusive jurisdiction.76 The Court noted that RICO "provides that suits of the kind described 'may' be brought in the federal district courts, not that they must be."17 (stating minority views on the amendment, which complain that new burden on federal courts is "potentially crushing" and that federal court judges will have to tum to state courts for guidance during the course of the suit). No House member suggested the obvious solu· tion: that such mixed claims of federal and state law could be brought in state court.
shared by courts and agencies. Where, as in RCRA, the statute has explicitly delineated the jurisdictional relationship, a court cannot transfer its duties to an administrative body, particularly when those duties achieve the very goals that the primary jurisdiction doctrine seeks to protect. Beyond seeking an agency's opinion on a limited fac tual matter,79 a court should not decline jurisdiction of a RCRA citizen suit based on primary jurisdiction.
II. BURFORD .A BSTENTION
The Burford abstention doctrine seeks to protect "complex state administrative processes" from undue interference by the federal courts.80 Three core comp onents are necessary for the app lication of the Burford doctrine: the presence in a case of "distinctively local regulatory facts or policies";81 a danger that federal court adju dication will disrupt a state's policy or regulatory framework on a broad basis;82 and an assurance that the federal court plaintiffs will be able to pursue their claim in state courts if the federal court dismisses the matter.83 The doctrine should be applied only in rare and compelling ci rcum stances.84 The Supreme Court has described the federal courts' obliga tion to hear suits within their jurisdiction as "virtually unflagging. for an application of Burford abstention is not present in a RCRA citizen suit, which provides a federal cause of action and requires the application of federal law. Section II.A.1 addresses the "local law" requirement of Burford and argues that in passing RCRA, Congress explicitly defined waste disposal as a matter of national concern and developed a comprehensive federal statutory scheme. Section II.A.2 illustrates that the concern that fe deral courts might interfere with a state's efforts to establish a coherent waste disposal policy is not rele vant in the RCRA context. Section II.A.3 demonstrates that fe deral courts that have applied Burford in situations where states have de veloped a specialized state court review system have mistaken a pre requisite for applying the doctrine for a satisfaction of its criteria. This error has allowed a circumvention of the federal focus of the statute.
1.

The Statutory Framework
RCRA's comprehensive mandate deprives a federal court of the authority to define waste disposal as a local problem. As discussed in Part I, RCRA establishes waste disposal as a matter of national con cern.86 Unlike the particularly local issues held applicable for Burford abstention, a RCRA citizen suit presents a statutory fe deral cause of action to enforce national minimum standards and thus does not pro vide the types of state-based legal issues that would implicate Burford. been treated as a local problem.88 Second, others have claimed that once the EPA has authorized a state program to operate "in lieu"89 of RCRA's federal regulations, the issues at stake in a RCRA citizen suit become local matters suitable for abstention.90 Neither of these char acterizations is persuasive.
The first rationale, based on the characterization of land use law as a local matter, ignores the fact that the specifically national attention given by Congress to solid and hazardous waste disposal overrides the traditional treatment of a general area of law.91 RCRA's clear na tional mandate does not allow retreat to the traditional view of waste disposal as a local land use issue. Aug. 17, 1994) . This reasoning appears to reflect a concern that the court's adjudication would amount to legislative, rather than judicial, action. If a court finds the task before it to be truly legisla tive in character, it should dismiss the action on ripeness grounds, not under Burford. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. 350, 372 (1989); see also Young, supra note 2, at 886-900 (discussing blurred distinctions over time between "legislative," "executive," and "judicial" legal forms, and the mystification of the administrative law process at the time Burford doctrine devel oped). 
Specialized State Court Review
The final rationale for Burford abstention of RCRA citizen suits, that the state has developed a specialized court process for review of state administrative decisions, is unpersuasive for three reasons: the purpose underlying the state court review requirement, which seeks to protect plaintiffs' interests if their federal case is dismissed; the failure of a state court procedural rule to supply a substantive state interest; and the opportunity such a rule would provide to circumvent the fed eral statute.
First, the rationale behind Burford's state court review rule, providing fairness to litigants, weighs heavily against abstention. Under RCRA, Congress has conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the fe deral courts for the vindication of a statutory right.107 Citizen plaintiffs cannot pursue their RCRA claims if a fe deral court abstains under Burford.
The second reason weighing against using state court review as a ground for abstention is that a state's establishment of a specialized state court review process does not provide a state interest that over rides RCRA's statutory jurisdictional grants.108 The federal or state nature of a statutory scheme stems from its substantive subj ect matter, not from the procedural trappings of one system or another.109 In passing RCRA, Congress clearly delineated the substantive federal is sues at stake.
Third, federal court abstention based on state court reviewability creates an opportunity for recalcitrant states to avoid federal judicial review under RCRA by developing "specialized" state court proce dures that the state claims are central to the development of a state waste disposal policy. Such procedures, which could be as simple as assigning challenges to state administrative procedures to a court in a particular county,110 would allow a state to become the final judge of 110. See Ada-Cascade Wa tch Co. , 720 F2d at 905 (holding that Michigan had manifested its solid and hazardous waste decisions, and thus would defeat the statutory mandate in favor of ongoing federal oversight.
B. Permitting and Siting Challenges
RCRA's expansive jurisdictional grants leave a federal court with little discretion as to whether to decline jurisdiction of a citizen suit. Some citizen suits, however, amount solely to challenges of permitting or siting determinations. These suits make no claim that the defen dant company has violated a permit or that the disposal plan will be endangering for reasons not considered by the permitting agency; rather, they question the validity of the agency's permitting or siting determination. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have abstained from hearing such citizen suits by invoking the Burford doctrine.111 In turn, these decisions have paved the way for courts to use the doctrine to decline jurisdiction in other types of RCRA citizen suits.112
This section argues that Congress did not intend for citizen suits to provide a federal forum for the review of solid or hazardous waste disposal permits or siting determinations, but instead, designed the statute so that the permitting and siting decisions of the EPA and state agencies would have res judicata effect on this type of citizen suit challenge. Section II.B.1 illustrates that RCRA's broad jurisdictional grant does not extend to suits that simply challenge an agency's per mitting or siting decision. Section II.B.2 maintains that the statutorily provided review process regarding permitting and siting determina tions should be plaintiffs' exclusive forum as long as they were granted a full hearing of the issues subsequently raised in the RCRA citizen suit. This statutory exclusion obviates the necessity for courts to em ploy the Burford abstention doctrine to dismiss RCRA citizen suits that challenge permits and siting.
1.
Statutory Bars
The broad statutory authority for RCRA citizen suits does not ex tend to actions that are simply appeals of state or EPA permitting or siting decisions. Two specific jurisdictional limits illustrate that Con gress did not intend citizen suits to provide an avenue for permitting or siting appeals.113 desire for coherent policy by centralizing review of hazardous waste management in one county's circuit court; centralization allowed that court to gain expertise in the field). [Vol. 98:269
The first jurisdictional limit, section 6976(b ), constrains the forum for all EPA-issued permit challenges to circuit court review within ninety days of the permitting decision.114 Section 6976(b) further states that after the 90 days have passed, the terms of permits may not be challenged in any suit for enforcement.115 Because the provision describes the barred claims as "enforcement suits," some commenta tors116 and plaintiffs have claimed that the jurisdictional bar applies only to "enforcement" suits, which challenge violations of the statute or a permit,117 and not to "imminent endangerment" suits, which chal lenge conditions that pose an immediate danger to the environment.118 This "plain meaning" reading accomplishes a result contrary to the structure of the statute as a whole.
The jurisdictional bar applies to both types of RCRA citizen suits for two reasons. The chronology of the amendments is thus ambiguous: on one hand, Congress may have used generic statutory language for environmental legislation and failed to consider the necessity of broader language for RCRA's judicial review provision; on the other hand, Congress must have considered that necessity because the endangerment provisions were specifically on the table at the time, and rejected estoppel that would preclude permit or siting challenges as part of an endangerment citizen suit. ment of the statute.120 While endangerment suits have now been brought against permitted facilities, the jurisdictional provision had in the past only been used to address abandoned or dormant facilities that had not undergone a permitting process.121 Thus there would have appeared no possibility that endangerment suit defendants could mount a permit challenge defense, making the bar of section 6976(b) irrelevant to that typ e of suit.
Second, applying the permit-challenge bar only to enforcement suits would interpret the section in a manner that conflicts with other provisions of RCRA. In other parts of the Act, the jurisdictional grant for enforcement suits is more generous than that for endangerment suits. The endangerment provision requires a longer waiting period between the time notice is given to the defendant and governmental officials and the time suit is filed.122 In addition, the endangerment cause of action is precluded by a wider variety of governmental reme dial steps.123 It would be illogical to grant a stricter jurisdictional bar on enforcement suits, the more encouraged provision in the statutory scheme, than on endangerment suits.
Allowing citizen suits as an alternative route for permitting and siting challenges would create one further, serious statutory inconsis tency: the scope of judicial review of the agency's decision would be different under the permit-review provision than under the permit challenge citizen suit. The scope of judicial review under section 6976(b) of RCRA occurs pursuant to the standards of the Administra [Vol. 98:269
In hearing a citizen suit, on the other hand, a district court looks at all issues of endangerment on a blank slate and would labor under no such statutory restraints.127 The statute cannot plausibly contain such disparate review standards based merely on the plaintiff's choice of statutory provision.
In summ ary, the history of section 6976(b), the jurisdictional treatment of endangerment suits compared to enforcement suits, and the inconsistent scopes of review between the permit-review and citi zen suit provisions all demonstrate that section 6976(b) should apply with equal force whether a plaintiff brings an endangerment or en forcement suit regarding a permitted facility. A citizen suit may not function as an alternate route to the circuit court for appeal of a per mitting decision of the EP A.128
The second jurisdictional bar, section 6972(b )(2)(D), prohibits imminent endangerment suits as a challenge to either EPA or state siting or permitting of a "hazardous waste treatment, storage, or a dis posal facility."129 The fact that the provision mentions hazardous waste and not solid waste again reflects a failure to anticipate the breadth of purposes for which imminent endangerment suits have come to be used.
The inclusion of section 6972(b) (2) (D) reflected a realization that citizen plaintiffs might otherwise use their imminent endangerment authority, an "emergency" provision, to challenge the siting of haz ardous waste facilities.130 Including solid waste siting and permitting in the bar would have appeared unnecessary. RCRA defines "hazardous waste" as solid waste that could be endangering to human health or the environment.131 Only hazardous waste, therefore, would seem to present conditions giving rise to an imminent endangerment cause of 127. No citizen suit provision mentions any deference to any permitting terms. This si lence is consistent with the thesis of this Note that citizen suits are not meant as permit challenge mechanisms. The 1984 House Report regarding section 6972(b)(2) (D) confirms this reading, concluding that "other legal authority [besides citizen suits] is available to challenge deficiencies in the permitting proc ess. "133 To read the statute as creating an exception for citizen suits that challenge solid waste disp osal permits reaches an absurd result: citizen plaintiffs would have more authority under the endangerment provision to challenge solid waste disposal than hazardous waste dis posal, even though the latter category is defined by its potential for endangerment.134
Congress intended neither the enforcement nor endangerment RCRA citizen suit provisions to provide an alternate route for direct permit appeal. Admittedly, no single statutory provision spells out a blanket prohibition on citizen suits as permit challenges. Yet when the statutory authority disallowing particular types of such actions is taken together, as Table 1 demonstrates, it is apparent that Congress did not consider citizens' dissatisfaction with siting or permitting deci sions, without any other complaint, to state a cause of action under RCRA. Other Opportunities for Hearing Although RCRA's citizen suit relief is unavailable for siting and permit challenges, other legal procedures allow public participation during the process of site determination and issuance or denial of permits. RCRA protects citizens by building a number of procedural opportunities into the requirements of the permitting and siting proc ess. These mechanisms allow some form of citizen involvement at all stages of the regulatory process.
Opportunities for public participation extend to siting and the is suance of permits. Before issuing any permit, the EPA must provide public notice of its intent and must hold hearings if it receives written notice of opposition to the permit.135 In order for a state to be authorized to operate in lieu of the EPA, the state must abide by equivalent notice and hearing requirements.136 RCRA also provides that "any person" may petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any regulations.137
Once the EPA has reached a permitting decision, citizen plaintiffs may appeal directly to a fe deral circuit court.138 While RCRA does not specify a method of appeal for state-issued permits, the availability of judicial review under a state's program is taken into account by the EPA when it decides whether to approve the state's program.139 This emphasis on congressionally required opportunities to participate in the proceedings and to appeal supports the notion that the statute cre ates a route for citizen input within the permitting and siting process that citizen suits may not circumvent.
Permit challenges through citizen suits should still be available in certain limited circumstances: where new issues arise after the issu ance of the permit and appellate review is no longer available;140 or where, under a state-approved program, the plaintiffs have not been allowed to participate in the permitting process or to obtain judicial review of the permit. Other than these situations, there is no statutory authority under RCRA to use a citizen suit as a permit or siting ap peal. The use of Burford dismissals rather than statutory authority to dismiss such suits has lead to a distortion of the doctrine and to dis missals of other types of RCRA suits that were properly before a court.
***
Burford allows a federal court to avoid a collision with distinctively local regulatory schemes, not to substitute its judgment for that of Congress about what types of state court action should preclude a RCRA citizen suit. Where, as in RCRA, Congress has created a com prehensive, national, legislative scheme, a federal court lacks the power to redefine the issue as "local," and to reassess when it should assume jurisdiction. For suits which simply amount to challenges of a permitting or siting process, federal courts need not resort to absten tion to refuse jurisdiction because there is no statutory authority for citizen suits in those situations. For other kinds of RCRA citizen suits, fe deral courts must assume jurisdiction unless the statutorily defined enforcement action has been undertaken.
III. .AB STENTION AND THE V ALUES OF F EDERALISM
Given the specificity and breadth of RCRA's statutory scheme, ab staining from hearing a RCRA citizen suit is outside the established boundaries of the Burford and primary jurisdiction doctrines. Even beyond the statutory mandate, abstention fails to serve the values of federalism claimed by pro-abstention advocates. Courts and commen tators have credited federalism with advancing a number of benefits, including the opportunity for citizen involvement, a government more responsive to its citizens through interstate competition and innova tion and experimentation in government. 143. The New Yo rk opinion alludes to this focus by noting that the Constitution would require a vertical separation of powers between the national government and the states even if "federalism secured no advantages to anyone." 505 U.S. at 157.
[Vol. 98:269 strates that the statutory framework of RCRA explicitly addresses the instrumentalist benefits of federalism.
Section III.B argues that constitutional doctrine amply addresses federalism's normative claim and is compromised by common law additions.
A. Instrumentalist Va lues
RCRA already takes into account federalism's claimed benefits of responsiveness, innovation, and citizen involvement. The statute's structure of cooperative federalism seeks to build the values of re sponsiveness and innovation into the waste disposal scheme. RCRA citizen suits directly involve citizen participation, a value which ab stention can make no plausible claim to advance.
Acting alone, state and local governments may face heavy pressure to lower their environmental standards.144 Competition among states may translate better into a competition for businesses who prefer minimal environmental regulation than into a contest for the cleanest waste program.145 The problems of economic competition, along with externalities created when one state's pollution affects another state's environment,146 identify the field as one justifying national legislation in some fashion.147
Supporters of the values of federalism should view cooperative federal-state statutes such as RCRA as the best type of national legis lation: the statute aims to preserve some state autonomy rather than to preempt the field altogether. RCRA facilitates government re sponsiveness and innovation by encouraging states to operate pro grams in lieu of its statutory terms,148 an approach which allows state agencies flexibility in their approaches to solid and hazardous waste disposal.149 RCRA balances those local advantages against the need for national minimum standards by eliminating competition based on safety levels.150 Broadly applied, a body of abstention dismissals dis-courages such cooperative arrangements by sending a message to Congress that fe deral law preemption is necessary to create enforce able solid and hazardous waste standards.
Ab stention has an even weaker claim regarding the third instru mentalist value, that of promoting citizen involvement. This value ad dresses the comparative ease of taking part in a local legislative proc ess as opposed to a national one.151 To the extent that this assumption has force, it is inapplicable to the arena of judicial review. When citi zens have an interest that becomes sufficiently pronounced to bring suit in a court,152 the jurisdictional grant under RCRA enables them access to a regulatory process that is no more cumbersome for being federal rather than state or local. Where federal courts abstain from such suits, it is hard to imagine how citizen involvement is enhanced: the plaintiffs cannot bring suit,153 and there is no other group whose participatory opportunities increase.
RCRA accommodates both the instrumentalist values of federal ism and the necessity for some national action in order to achieve en vironmental goals. RCRA explicitly preserves an active role for states and promotes public participation through citizen suits, the very ave nue that abstention would obstruct.
B. Diffusion of Power
Federalism's normative claim of power diff usion between the na tional and state governments also fails to support an application of ab stention doctrines. The Supreme Court's evolving federalism juris prudence has rested mainly on this claim, rej ecting federal laws that require states to enact specific legislation154 or engage the efforts of state executive officers.155 One might argue that abstention should rest on this view as well, acting as a weak lower court signal that comple ments and reinforces the constitutional federalism doctrines. This view is misguided.
The constitutional analysis developing in the Supreme Court's fed eralism jurisprudence has foreclosed several avenues through which Congress can create federal-state partnerships in order to bring about national, uniform legislation. (holding unconstitutional federal law that "commandeered" state legislatures).
[Vol. 98:269 must enact particular legislation in return for optional federal fun d ing;157 and conditional preemption, the statutory scheme employed under RCRA, where a state chooses either to regulate pursuant to federal guidelines or to allow the federal government to regulate the field itself.158 Because each of these statutory structures allows state governments to choose whether or not to participate in the federal plan,159 the Supreme Court considers them a minimal threat to state autonomy. 160 Abstention from RCRA citizen suits on common law federalism grounds ignores the balance established by the Supreme Court in the constitutional arena. In disallowing certain types of federal-state ar rangements created by Congress, the Court implicitly relied on the permissibility of other mechanisms as a means for Congress and states to create cooperative working relationships.161 Lower federal courts should not understand the Supreme Court's federalism doctrine as a cry to arms against any intergovernmental cooperation but rather rec ognize that restrictive rules in some areas are balanced against expan sive rules in others. 162 The growth of constitutional federalism should thus discourage lower federal courts from abstaining from a suit whose underlying federal statute passes constitutional muster. Rather than adopting the position that if a little federalism doctrine is good, even more will be better, federal courts should take into account the federalism struc- 163-66 (1998) . Cantinker advances the theory that courts might accommodate the enforcement of federal norms and concerns for state dignity across a set of doctrines rather than within the precise delineation of a single rule. See id.
tures developed by the Court that already limit and shape congres sional power over the states.
CONCLUSION
In enacting RCRA, Congress fashioned a comprehensive regula tory scheme dependant on the interplay among various governmental actors performing specific roles. When a federal court forgoes juris diction over a RCRA citizen suit under Burford abstention or primary jurisdiction, it frustrates the congressional scheme and misapplies those common law doctrines.
Dismissals of RCRA citizen suits on primary jurisdiction grounds fail to recognize that the jurisdictional gaps necessary to apply the doctrine are absent from RCRA. Such dismissals thwart the policy considerations of uniformity, technical expertise, and fairness to plaintiffs . The core prerequisites for Burford abstention, distinctively local law issues and an independent state regulatory process, are absent from a RCRA citizen suit. A state's provision of a centralized review process cannot remedy those absences for purposes of applying Burford. Cases where citizen suits amount to challenges of agency siting or permitting determinations should be dismissed on statutory, not Burford, grounds.
While abstention may seem consistent with the new environment of state-centered fe deralism, dismissals of RCRA citizen suits on Burford or primary jurisdiction grounds thwart the values of federalism claimed by its proponents and discourage the development of coherent doctrines of constitutional federalism. Given a statute with sound constitutional fo oting, federal courts should respect the roles assigned to them by RCRA's framework and assume jurisdiction when the law so requires.
